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# Capital Market Integration and Growth Across the United States



EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

EUROSYSTEM

#### Capital Market Integration and Growth Across the United States

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#### Motivation:

- Capital markets still regionally fragmented, both in developing countries and modern currency unions (EZ)
- Large debate on merits and drawbacks of EU Capital Market and Banking Union

#### **Research Questions:**

- What causes the geographic integration of capital markets within a currency union?
- How does the mobility of financial capital enabled by these markets affects growth across regions?

#### Setting:

• Digitize historical data to study the US banking system *before* branching deregulation (1953-83).

### Results:

Despite no change in regulation, **financial markets became more integrated in this period.** 

Maxim Alekseev

Harvard University

- Rise in nominal rates due to Great Inflation caused 51% of this integration: *«nominal rate channel»* of financial integration.
- High nominal rates push households to move liquidity away from unremunerated deposits and towards national money markets, which redistribute across regions.

#### Financial integration had **large effects on GDP growth in initially capital-scarce regions** of the US

- Firms borrow at lower cost and could expand production, bids up wages and returns to physical capital.
- Leads to in-migration and investment.

**Policy counterfactual:** effects of deregulation that integrates capital markets are larger in low-rate environments.

(A) Initial Differences in Local Lending Rates (B) Convergence in 1959-83 (1953-58) $r_{i,59-83}^{L} - r_{i,53-58}^{L} = \alpha + \beta r_{i,53-58}^{L} + \varepsilon_{i}$ MA  $\beta = -0.54^{***}$  (SE: 0.072) MO MD Av. Rate Δ, p.p. ('59 to '83) NE MT 2.5 ND AZ Deviation of WV lending rate 40 -40 0 80 120 4.5 from mean (bps) Lending Rate, % ('53-'58, average) (C) Financial Convergence is Faster In High Nominal Rate Years  $r_{j,t}^{L} - r_{j,53-58}^{L} = \alpha_{t} + \beta_{t} r_{j,53-58}^{L} + \varepsilon_{jt}$ gence  $(-\beta_t)$ 15 1.5

(A): Large differences across states in local bank loan rates in 1953-58

(B): These differences halve by 1983


(**C**): This narrowing of differentials is strongly correlated with the level of nominal rates.

Other channels hard to square with data: risk differentials narrowing, competition, real convergence

## **(D):** Theory that rationalizes why high nominal rates can foster integration.

- Frictional access to national markets (expensive wholesale financing).
- Banks in states where deposits from households are abundant relative to loan demand face lower funding costs → lower





- loan rates charged.
- However, when nominal rates *rise*, deposits move to money markets.
- Levels the playing field, all banks now need to rely more on national markets instead of local retail deposits.

(E): Integration has real consequences. States with initially higher interest rates benefit and grow more.

• Growth driven mostly by attracting workers from other states.

(**F**): Quantification of real effects. Transitional dynamics after integration of financial markets.

- Firms in initially capital-scarce places expand production, bids up wages and rental rates of physical capital.
- 1 investment and attracts workers
- Financial integration can explain up to 20%
  of relative differences in growth of South and
  West and of Northern Financial Centers,
  compared to the average US state.

