

THE JOB LADDER: INFLATION VS. REALLOCATION

Giuseppe Moscarini

Yale University and NBER

Fabien Postel-Vinay

UCL and IFS

September 2024

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The **Phillips Curve**, an inverse short-run relationship between **aggregate slack** and **inflation**, is still a guiding principle of monetary policy.

Traditional measures of aggregate slack focus on the unemployment rate.

INTRODUCTION

The **Phillips Curve**, an inverse short-run relationship between **aggregate slack** and **inflation**, is still a guiding principle of monetary policy.

Traditional measures of aggregate slack focus on the unemployment rate.

Theoretical ‘organizing framework’: the **New Keynesian (NK) model**.

$$\pi_t = \kappa \widehat{mc}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$$

π_t : price (or wage) inflation

\widehat{mc}_t : real marginal cost

κ : slope of the PC

β : discount factor

INTRODUCTION

The **Phillips Curve**, an inverse short-run relationship between **aggregate slack** and **inflation**, is still a guiding principle of monetary policy.

Traditional measures of aggregate slack focus on the unemployment rate.

Theoretical ‘organizing framework’: the **New Keynesian (NK) model**.

$$\pi_t = \kappa \widehat{mc}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$$

π_t : price (or wage) inflation

\widehat{mc}_t : real marginal cost

κ : slope of the PC

β : discount factor

In this work, we revisit the determinants of the Marginal Cost \widehat{mc}_t

INTRODUCTION

$$\pi_t = \kappa \widehat{mc}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$$

Standard NK model: competitive labor markets, MC is the productivity-adjusted real wage, a function of the unemployment rate (or the output gap).

INTRODUCTION

$$\pi_t = \kappa \widehat{mc}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$$

Standard NK model: competitive labor markets, MC is the productivity-adjusted real wage, a function of the unemployment rate (or the output gap).

Alternative organizing framework: the **Job Ladder**.

- **Jobs are heterogeneous**, and workers all agree on ranking of jobs.
- Employed workers receive outside job offers at a finite, procyclical rate.

INTRODUCTION

$$\pi_t = \kappa \widehat{mc}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$$

Standard NK model: competitive labor markets, MC is the productivity-adjusted real wage, a function of the unemployment rate (or the output gap).

Alternative organizing framework: the **Job Ladder**.

- **Jobs are heterogeneous**, and workers all agree on ranking of jobs.
- Employed workers receive outside job offers at a finite, procyclical rate.

In that world, outside job offers generate:

- Employer-to-employer (EE) **reallocation** if accepted.
- Rent extraction and **inflationary pressure** if matched by incumbent employer and declined.

INTRODUCTION

Inflation vs. reallocation: which one dominates depends on how well matched (and thus prone to decline outside offers) workers are.

Mismatch is a relevant measure of 'slack' on the labor market.

INTRODUCTION

Inflation vs. reallocation: which one dominates depends on how well matched (and thus prone to decline outside offers) workers are.

Mismatch is a relevant measure of 'slack' on the labor market.

In practice, the **Acceptance Ratio (AC)** is an empirical proxy for mismatch:

$$AC = \frac{\text{EE transition rate}}{\text{UE transition rate}}$$

INTRODUCTION

Inflation vs. reallocation: which one dominates depends on how well matched (and thus prone to decline outside offers) workers are.

Mismatch is a relevant measure of 'slack' on the labor market.

In practice, the **Acceptance Ratio (AC)** is an empirical proxy for mismatch:

$$\begin{aligned} AC &= \frac{\text{EE transition rate}}{\text{UE transition rate}} \\ &= \frac{\text{empl. search effort}}{\text{unempl. search effort}} \cdot \frac{\text{empl. contact rate}}{\text{unempl. contact rate}} \cdot \frac{\text{empl. acceptance prob}}{\text{unempl. acceptance prob}} \end{aligned}$$

INTRODUCTION

Inflation vs. reallocation: which one dominates depends on how well matched (and thus prone to decline outside offers) workers are.

Mismatch is a relevant measure of 'slack' on the labor market.

In practice, the **Acceptance Ratio (AC)** is an empirical proxy for mismatch:

$$\begin{aligned} AC &= \frac{\text{EE transition rate}}{\text{UE transition rate}} \\ &= \frac{\text{empl. search effort}}{\text{unempl. search effort}} \cdot \frac{\text{empl. contact rate}}{\text{unempl. contact rate}} \cdot \frac{\text{empl. acceptance prob}}{\text{unempl. acceptance prob}} \end{aligned}$$

INTRODUCTION

Inflation vs. reallocation: which one dominates depends on how well matched (and thus prone to decline outside offers) workers are.

Mismatch is a relevant measure of 'slack' on the labor market.

In practice, the **Acceptance Ratio (AC)** is an empirical proxy for mismatch:

$$\begin{aligned} AC &= \frac{\text{EE transition rate}}{\text{UE transition rate}} \\ &= \frac{\text{empl. search effort}}{\text{unempl. search effort}} \cdot \frac{\text{empl. contact rate}}{\text{unempl. contact rate}} \cdot \frac{\text{empl. acceptance prob}}{\text{unempl. acceptance prob}} \end{aligned}$$

Both ratios are high when employed workers are poorly matched.

TWO PARTS OF THIS PRESENTATION

1. Empirical evidence: Measures of inflation comove with AC.
2. New Keynesian DSGE model with On-the-Job Search, featuring an endogenous balance between labor reallocation and rent extraction.
 - **Novel propagation mechanism**: average match quality in employment is a slow-moving state variable, which propagates aggregate shocks.
 - **Tractable treatment of search frictions & on-the-job search in the NK framework.**

DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE

EE REALLOCATION AND INFLATION

EE REALLOCATION: ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE


Monthly EE transition probability is about 2% of employment.

Monthly UE transition probability is about 30% of unemployment.

Employment (E) stock is 10-20 times the unemployment (U) stock.


Conclusion: EE and UE flows are of similar magnitudes for employment reallocation.

AGGREGATE TIME SERIES: UE AND EE RATES



Source: CPS and Fujita, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2022)

AGGREGATE TIME SERIES: AC AND INFLATION RATES



FINDINGS

Overall, the data show a robust **negative relationship between the $AC = EE/UE$ ratio and subsequent inflation.**

We conclude that our empirical “acceptance rate” is a (inverse) predictor of inflation.

We now propose a theoretical model that makes sense, qualitatively and quantitatively, of this evidence.

**A NEW KEYNESIAN
DSGE MODEL
WITH A JOB LADDER**

FLOW CHART

New Keynesian block. Standard 3-equations model describes supply and demand in the Final goods market and monetary policy rule.

FLOW CHART

New Keynesian block. Standard 3-equations model describes supply and demand in the Final goods market and monetary policy rule.

Nominal Marginal Cost. TFP-adjust. price ω_t of an intermediate input (“Service”), sold in a competitive market.

FLOW CHART

New Keynesian block. Standard 3-equations model describes supply and demand in the Final goods market and monetary policy rule.

Nominal Marginal Cost. TFP-adjust. price ω_t of an intermediate input (“Service”), sold in a competitive market.

Job Search block. Firms produce Service input using labor, that they hire in a decentralized (frictional) search market.

FLOW CHART

New Keynesian block. Standard 3-equations model describes supply and demand in the Final goods market and monetary policy rule.

Nominal Marginal Cost. TFP-adjust. price ω_t of an intermediate input (“Service”), sold in a competitive market.

Job Search block. Firms produce Service input using labor, that they hire in a decentralized (frictional) search market.

- Replaces neoclassical labor supply.
- Service output \simeq “packaged labor”.
- Service price $\omega_t \simeq$ “average nominal wage”.

LABOR MARKET: SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS IN G.E.

Workers and firms face search frictions in the Service sector.

Job ladder: Upon meeting in pairs, draw constant match productivity $y \sim \Gamma$.

When searching on the job, workers seek to reallocate to higher- y matches.

Recruiters compete in contracts for both unemployed and employed workers in Sequential Auctions à la Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).

Implies that it is more costly to poach a worker out of a higher-quality (higher- y) match.

JOB CREATION

Job creation is governed by the **Free-Entry Condition**:

Marginal Hiring Cost =
*Increasing function
of labor market tightness*

(Expected surplus from unemployed hire)
"Labor Wedge": *Average sampled match quality minus MRS*

JOB CREATION

Job creation is governed by the **Free-Entry Condition**:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal Hiring Cost} = & \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\substack{\text{Increasing function} \\ \text{of labor market tightness}}} \\ & (\text{Prob. of } \underline{\text{unemployed}} \text{ job applicant}) \times \underbrace{(\text{Expected surplus from } \underline{\text{unemployed}} \text{ hire})}_{\text{"Labor Wedge": Average sampled match quality minus MRS}} \\ & + (\text{Prob. of } \underline{\text{employed}} \text{ job applicant}) \times \underbrace{(\text{Expected surplus from } \underline{\text{employed}} \text{ hire})}_{\text{"Mismatch Wedge": Function of match quality distribution amongst currently existing matches}} \end{aligned}$$

JOB CREATION

Job creation is governed by the **Free-Entry Condition**:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Marginal Hiring Cost} = & \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\substack{\text{Increasing function} \\ \text{of labor market tightness}}} \\ & (\text{Prob. of } \underline{\text{unemployed}} \text{ job applicant}) \times \underbrace{(\text{Expected surplus from } \underline{\text{unemployed}} \text{ hire})}_{\text{"Labor Wedge": Average sampled match quality minus MRS}} \\ & + (\text{Prob. of } \underline{\text{employed}} \text{ job applicant}) \times \underbrace{(\text{Expected surplus from } \underline{\text{employed}} \text{ hire})}_{\text{"Mismatch Wedge": Function of match quality distribution amongst currently existing matches}} \end{aligned}$$

An **improvement in the employment allocation** (higher quality of existing matches) **leads to**:

- A fall in the Mismatch Wedge, hence on the profitability of (employed) hires;
- Falls in vacancies, hires, job ladder upgrading, the supply of Service;
- A **rise in the nominal Marginal Cost** ω_t for **Final good producers**.

SOME RESULTS

QUANTITATIVE EXPLORATION


We linearize and simulate a version of the model featuring:

- a **Taylor rule** with nominal interest rate smoothing
- an **intensive margin of labor supply** (choice of hours) into the production of Service

We first estimate the Taylor rule directly by GMM, then calibrate the rest of the model to match steady-state moments.

IMPULSE RESPONSES TO 'PERMANENT' SHOCKS


(CONTRACTIONARY SHOCKS TO TFP, MONETARY POLICY, CONSUMPTION/LEISURE MRS)



Solid line: CJS, Dashed line: no CJS.

IMPULSE RESPONSES TO 'PERMANENT' SHOCKS




(CONTRACTIONARY SHOCKS TO TFP, MONETARY POLICY, CONSUMPTION/LEISURE MRS)



Solid line: CJS, Dashed line: no CJS.

IMPULSE RESPONSES TO 'PERMANENT' SHOCKS

(CONTRACTIONARY SHOCKS TO TFP, MONETARY POLICY, CONSUMPTION/LEISURE MRS)



CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. **Empirical evidence:** $AC = EE/UE$ probability ratio is countercyclical and negatively correlated with wage growth.

Also true conditional on the level of unemployment.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. **Empirical evidence:** $AC = EE/UE$ probability ratio is countercyclical and negatively correlated with wage growth.

Also true conditional on the level of unemployment.

2. **Theory:** AC is a revealed-preference measure of misallocation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. **Empirical evidence:** $AC = EE/UE$ probability ratio is countercyclical and negatively correlated with wage growth.

Also true conditional on the level of unemployment.

2. **Theory:** AC is a revealed-preference measure of misallocation.
3. **Conclusion:** **Quality, not just quantity, of employment matters.**
 - Non-employment is just the bottom rung of a very high ladder.
 - Central banks should watch AC.

THANK YOU!