


Globotics and macroeconomics: Globalisation and automation of the service sector

RICHARD BALDWIN

PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

What is globotics?




Introduction & outline


- Globalisation is changing
- Services are important but different
- Globotics, services, and HICP developments

Globalisation is
changing

Goods trade peaked: The “offshoring-expansion” phase ended




But beware false peaks & lazy narrative



- China peaked 10yrs before Trump/Brexit
- US peaked 2011
- Jpn peaked in 2014
- EU has stagnated not peaked (mixed trends)



Percentage points change (1990 to 2008, x-axis; 2008 to 2020 y-axis)

Growth
2008-
2020





Growth
1990-2008

China is key: Becoming normal mega-economies, but with asymmetric supply chain engagement



Services trade didn't peak (WORLD)





NB: 'Other Commerce Services' = All services less Transport & Travel/Tourism


Services trade has not peaked (EA19)

Cumulative growth in levels of services vs goods trade
(1990 = 100)


NB: levels, not trade/GDP



EU Service/GDP peakers & non-peakers




Goods peaked;
not services
Why?



Arbitrage drives globalisation (constrained by 3 costs)

Trade costs



Goods

Communication
costs



Knowhow

Face-to-face costs



Labour
services

Comparative advantage changed c. 1990

G7 economies

High $\frac{\text{Knowhow}}{\text{Labour}}$ + High wages = G7 comparative advantage

EM economies

Low $\frac{\text{Knowhow}}{\text{Labour}}$ + Low wages = EM comparative advantage

*2-way flow
of goods*

G7 economies

High $\frac{\text{Knowhow}}{\text{Labour}}$ + High wages = G7 comparative advantage

EM economies

Low $\frac{\text{Knowhow}}{\text{Labour}}$ Low wages = hybrid comparative advantage

*1-way flows
of knowhow
&
2-way flow
of goods*

Digitech lowers face-to-face costs, labour services cross borders “telemigration”

Headquarter Economies (G7)

High $\frac{\text{Knowhow}}{\text{Labour}}$

+ High wages

Factory Economies

Low $\frac{\text{Knowhow}}{\text{Labour}}$

+ Low wages

Nature of globalisation changes again, 3rd unbundling

The future of trade
is intermediate
services

4 facts and a conclusion


1. Barriers to services trade are much higher than barriers to goods trade
2. Most barriers to trade in intermediate services are technology-linked, not policy linked
3. Digitech is lowering barriers to intermediate services at an explosive pace (+ Covid forced adjustment)
4. Demand is huge in rich nations; Capacity is huge in emerging markets

ERGO: Intermediate services trade will grow much faster than goods trade for foreseeable future


(NB: Already 2 to 3 times faster since mid 2000s)

Services are
important but
different

1. Services in EA are important



2. FACT: Intermediate inputs are more important in services imports than manufactures imports




3. FACT: Service intermediates are 3x more important than manufacturing intermediates in overall economy

<i>Column sector's inputs into row sector (gross output) 2018</i>	Service intermediate inputs	Manufactures intermediate inputs	Sector share of total gross output
Service sector	32%	5%	68%
Manufacturing sector	24%	25%	26%
Total economy	30%	11%	100%

Every sector uses service intermediates

Service intermediates as share of sector's output




4. Service automation is different: “White collar robots”

- Computers acquire new cognitive skills since 2016 due to machine learning.
- New skills are automating service sector tasks
 - RPA, Virtual Assistants, IBM Watson, scheduling apps, etc
- What changed?

The programming changed

- Coding = thinking slow

Machine learning = thinking fast



5. Service automation & globalisation happen at the job or task level – not the product level


- Service sector automation varies by job (Frey & Osborne 2013)
- Service sector globalisation (teleworkability) varies by job (Dingel & Neiman 2020)
- By contrast, goods-sector globalisation and automation was at the product level – not job level.

‘globotics
quadrant’

*Susceptibility
by occupation*


x-axis =
automation

y-axis =
globalisation




Globotics and HICP developments

Services inflation: higher but less volatile




Excess services inflation by EA nations – 2001 to 2020



Services sub indices: fairly homogenous except communications


Service sub-indices, 2001 = 100



	HICP Weight (bp)
Housing	110
Miscellaneous	84
Recreation	153
Transport	72
Communications	26


Services inflation in context

HIPC & sub-indices, 2001 = 100




Calculation I
would have liked
to have done

Calculating the impact of service-sector globalisation



Missing data & mappings



A forward looking research work programme?

- Need price data
- Need mapping of imported services to domestic sectors & jobs

Key points

- Services are important in HICP (45%) and rising
- Service inflation generally higher but steadier
 - “Balassa-Samuelson effect”
- Communication services are very different
- Lots of heterogeneity across euro area members

Thanks
for
listening

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yet on the new
economic era'

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Robotics and the
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