Съдържанието не е налично на български език.
Florian Walch
- 13 September 2022
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 303Details
- Abstract
- Climate change can be a source of financial risk. This paper examines how credit rating agencies accepted by the Eurosystem incorporate climate change risk in their credit ratings. It also analyses how rating agencies disclose their assessments of climate change risks to rating users. The paper develops an analytical framework to compare the agencies’ definitions, methodologies, assessment models, data usage and disclosure practices. The paper reveals large differences in methodologies and disclosure practices across rating agencies and asset classes. The authors identify three main areas for improvement with respect to climate-related disclosures. These areas concern the level of granularity of definitions of climate change risk, the transparency around models and methods used to estimate the exposure to climate change risk and the disclosure of the magnitude of the impact of material climate change risk on credit ratings.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
- 2 December 2020
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 251Details
- Abstract
- As a response to the global financial crisis that started in 2008, many countries established dedicated resolution regimes that seek to limit the use of taxpayer money while maintaining the functions of failing banks that are critical for financial stability. This paper extends the existing research by zooming in on the specific topic of liquidity provision to banks in resolution. It examines the provision of liquidity in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and the banking union of the European Union (thereafter: the “banking union”). The paper observes the differences and commonalities of policy choices across jurisdictions with regard to both the relationship between private prefunding and temporary public liquidity provision and the roles of the public budget and the central bank. The comparison also reveals that the role of fiscal authorities is strong and that guarantees from a public budget are a common feature. The framework for the provision of liquidity in the banking union is not yet complete as the construction of a public sector backstop of sufficient size and speed is comparatively more complex in the banking union than in other jurisdictions. Therefore, the idea of establishing a European-level guarantee framework – which would allow access to Eurosystem liquidity for banks coming out of resolution with limited collateral – is being further investigated.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 22 May 2015
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1793Details
- Abstract
- Transaction cost shocks in financial markets are known to affect asset prices. This paper analyses how changes in transaction costs may affect the value of assets that banks use to collateralise borrowings in monetary policy operations. Based on a simple asset pricing model and employing a dataset of hypothetical Eurosystem collateral positions, we simulate and quantify the resulting change in collateral value pledged by counterparties to the Eurosystem, resulting from a transaction cost shock. A 10 basis point increase in transaction costs entails a direct -0.30% decrease of collateral value and a -0.07% decrease when adjusted for the expected reduction in the number of trades of each asset. We conclude that banks will on average suffer small collateral losses while selected institutions could face a considerably larger collateral decrease.
- JEL Code
- C15 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Statistical Simulation Methods: General
E59 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Other
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
- 18 June 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1556Details
- Abstract
- While there are many methods to measure the competitiveness of an economy, most of these concepts ignore the fact that competitiveness can change because of market processes like wage negotiation but also because of political decision-making. Governments that compete with others for factors of production face the incentive to adjust key policy variables to improve their competitive position. Disentangling market-induced and politics-induced changes in competitiveness is not easy, but strongly warranted given current discussions that some EMU Member States should improve their competitive position within the euro area by adjusting policy variables. Increasing country competitiveness is one of the key objectives currently discussed by policy makers in the context of creating an economic union in the euro area, to complement monetary union. We propose a new competitiveness index that captures the dimensions in which politics can influence competitiveness beyond factor price adjustments. Our index shows that the individual components of institutional competitiveness have developed heterogeneously among EMU Member States. To explain these divergent developments, the uneven integration within the EU Single Market may play a role.
- JEL Code
- E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
H11 : Public Economics→Structure and Scope of Government→Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
N44 : Economic History→Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation→Europe: 1913? - Network
- Competitiveness Research Network