Inte tillgängligt på svenska
Giuseppe Cappelletti
Macro Prud Policy&Financial Stability
- Division
Stress Test Modelling
- Current Position
-
Team Lead - Financial Stability
- Fields of interest
-
Microeconomics,Financial Economics,Other Special Topics
- Education
- 2007
Phd Economics Bocconi University
- Professional experience
- 2021-2021
Head of Division - Quantitative Analysis for Financial Stability (Bank of Italy)
- 10 May 2024
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 347Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents the updated macroprudential stress test for the euro area banking system, comprising around 100 of the largest euro area credit institutions across 19 countries. The approach involves modelling banks’ reactions to changing economic conditions. It also examines the effects of adverse scenarios as defined for the European Banking Authority’s 2023 stress test on economies and the financial system as a whole by acknowledging a broad set of interactions and interdependencies between banks, other market participants and the real economy. Our results highlight the resilience of the euro area banking system and the important role banks’ adjustments play in the propagation of shocks to the financial sector and real economy.
- JEL Code
- C30 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→General
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
C54 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Quantitative Policy Modeling
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 3 April 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2923Details
- Abstract
- How a historic drop in bank deposits shapes banks’ loan supply? We exploit the effects of a large, and unexpected, increase in monetary policy rates to estimate the deposit channel of monetary policy using an extensive credit register that includes all bank-firm lending relationships in all euro area countries. We find that banks experiencing large deposit outflows reduce credit, but not the interest rate they charge, to the same borrower relative to other lenders. This credit restriction is stronger for fixed rate and longer maturity loans, but not for riskier borrowers. The effect is mostly driven by banks coming into the hiking period with a larger unhedged duration gap that renders borrowers of those banks more vulnerable to credit restrictions due to the deposit outflows as interest rates surge. We resort to the deposit beta as an instrument variable and a matched estimator that bear out the thrust of our results.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 21 September 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2725Details
- Abstract
- One important source of systemic risk can arise from asset commonality among financial institutions. This indirect interconnection may occur when financial institutions invest in similar or correlated assets and is also described as overlapping portfolios. In this work, we propose a methodology to quantify systemic risk derived from asset commonality and we apply it to assess the degree of indirect interconnection of banks due to their financial holdings. Based on granular information of asset holdings of European significant banks, we compute the sensitivity based ∆ CoVaR which captures the potential sources of systemic risk originating from asset commonality. The novel indicator proves to be consistent with other indicators of systemic importance, yet it has a more transparent foundation in terms of the source of systemic risk, which can contribute to effective macroprudential supervision.
- JEL Code
- C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 25 August 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 260Details
- Abstract
- The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) framework used to identify global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) is based on banks’ balance sheet information, leaving information derived from market data untapped. Among the most widely used market-based systemic risk measures, Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2016) Delta-Conditional Value at Risk (ΔCoVaR) best captures the system-wide loss-given-default (sLGD) and conditional impact concepts underlying the BCBS GSIB methodology. In this paper we investigate, using a global sample of the largest banks, whether a score based on ΔCoVaR could be useful for ranking G-SIBs or for calibrating an alternative G-SIB indicator weighting scheme. In our first analysis we find that the ΔCoVaR score is positively correlated with all five of the systemic importance categories of the BCBS framework. However, considerable information/noise with regard to the ΔCoVaR score remains unexplained. Before more is known about this residual, a score based on ΔCoVaR is difficult to interpret and is inappropriate for identifying G-SIBs in a policy context. Besides, we find that a ranking based on ΔCoVaR is subject to substantial variability over time and across empirical specifications. In our second analysis we use ΔCoVaR to place the current static weighting scheme for G-SIB indicators on an empirical footing. To do this we regress ΔCoVaR on factors derived from the G-SIB indicators. This approach allows us to focus on the part of ΔCoVaR which can be explained by balance sheet information which alleviates the identified issues of interpretability and variability. The derived weights are highest for the cross-jurisdictional activity (43%) and size (27%) categories. We conclude that ΔCoVaR is not suitable for use as an alternative G-SIB score but could be useful for policymakers to pursue an empirically grounded weighting scheme for the existing G-SIB indicators.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 12 February 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2525Details
- Abstract
- Net trading income is an important but volatile source of revenue for many euro area banks deemed to be highly sensitive to changes in financial market conditions. We propose a two-step econometric approach to quantify the downside risk of financial shocks on the banks’ trading revenues. First, we estimate the parameters of a fixed-effects quantile autoregressive model conditional on exogenous macro-financial shocks and bank characteristics. In the second step, we approximate the entire empirical conditional distribution of net trading income across all banks and time horizons by interpolating between the estimated quantiles. Based on the estimated distribution function, we derive two key metrics that summarize conditional left tail risks: i) conditional shortfall, ii) material loss probability. These measures are relevant in a stress test exercise whose aim to gauge CET-1 capital depletion under an adverse macro-financial scenario. We apply our methodology on supervisory data for a representative sample of European banks over the period spanning from the first quarter of 2015 to the last quarter of 2020. We find that the lower quantiles of net trading revenue distribution are significantly impacted by deteriorating financial conditions, whereas the upper quantiles seem to be stable over time.
- JEL Code
- C21 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Cross-Sectional Models, Spatial Models, Treatment Effect Models, Quantile Regressions
C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 30 November 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2497Details
- Abstract
- We study the impact of macroprudential capital buffers on banking groups' lending and risk-taking decisions, also investigating implications for internal capital markets. For identification, we exploit heterogeneity in buffers applied to other systemically important institutions, using information from three unique confidential datasets, including information on the EBA scoring process. This policy design induces a randomized experiment in the neighborhood of the threshold, which we use to identify the effect of higher capital requirements by comparing the change in the outcome for banks just above and below the cut-off, before and after the introduction of the buffer. The analysis is implemented relying on a fuzzy regression discontinuity and on a difference-in-differences matching design. We find that, when parent banks are constrained with higher buffers, subsidiaries deleverage lending and risk-taking towards non-financial corporations and marginally expanded lending towards households, with negative effects on profitability. Also, we find that parents cut down on holdings of debt and equity issued by their subsidiaries. Our findings support the hypothesis that higher capital buffers have a positive disciplinary effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having a (temporary) adverse impact on the real economy through a decrease in affiliated banks' lending activity. Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, it is essential that policymakers assess their potential cross-border effects.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 6 July 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2440Details
- Abstract
- We investigate the impact of macroprudential capital requirements on bank lending behaviour across economic sectors, focusing on their potentially heterogenous effects and transmission channel. By employing confidential loan-level data for the euro area over 2015-18, we find that the reaction of banks to structural capital surcharges depends on the level of the required capital buffer and the economic sector of the borrowing counterpart. Although tighter buffer requirements correspond to stronger lending contractions, targeted banks curtail their lending towards credit institutions the most, while leaving loan supply to non-financial corporations almost unchanged. We find that this lending is mitigated when banks resort to central bank funding. These results have important policy implications as they provide evidence on the impact of macroprudential policy frameworks and their interaction with unconventional monetary policies.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E60 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 28 June 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2292Details
- Abstract
- We study the impact of higher bank capital buffers, namely of the Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SII) buffer, on banks' lending and risk-taking behaviour. The O-SII buffer is a macroprudential policy aiming to increase banks' resilience. However, higher capital requirements associated with the policy may likely constrain lending. While this may be a desired effect of the policy, it could, at least in the short-term, pose costs for economic activity. Moreover, by changing the relative attractiveness of different asset classes, a higher capital requirement could also lead to risk-shifting and therefore promote the build-up (or deleverage) of banks' risk-taking. Since the end of 2015, national authorities, under the EBA framework, started to identify banks as O-SII and impose additional capital buffers. The identification of the O-SII is mainly based on a cutoff rule, ie. banks whose score is above a certain threshold are automatically designated as systemically important. This feature allows studying the effects of higher capital requirements by comparing banks whose score was close to the threshold. Relying on confidential granular supervisory data, between 2014 and 2017, we find that banks identified as O-SII reduced, in the short-term, their credit supply to households and financial sectors and shifted their lending to less risky counterparts within the non-financial corporations. In the medium-term, the impact on credit supply is defused and banks shift their lending to less risky counterparts within the financial and household sectors. Our findings suggest that the discontinuous policy change had limited effects on the overall supply of credit although we find evidence of a reduction in the credit supply at the inception of the macroprudential policy. This result supports the hypothesis that the implementation of the O-SII's framework could have a positive disciplining effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having only a reduced adverse impact
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 28 July 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2089Details
- Abstract
- Multiple lending has been widely investigated from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Nevertheless, the implications of multiple lending for the stability of the banking system still need to be understood. By lending to a common set of borrowers, banks are interconnected and then exposed to financial contagion phenomena, even if not directly. In this paper, we investigate a specific type of externality that originates from those borrowers that obtain liquidity from more than one bank. In this case, contagion may occur if a bank hit by a liquidity shock calls in some loans and borrowers then pay them back by drawing money from other banks. We show that, under certain circumstances that make other sources of liquidity unavailable or too costly, multiple lending might be responsible for a large liquidity shortage.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 22 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2022Details
- Abstract
- We study the effect of counterparty risk on the ability of Italian banks to access the foreign unsecured interbank market during the sovereign debt crisis in the second half of 2011. With the onset of the crisis, interest rates in the Italian interbank market soared and foreign lending decreased significantly. To isolate the effect of the rise in counterparty risk, we compare the funding of Italian banks with that of foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries in Italy, which were presumably unaffected by the sovereign crisis insofar as they could count on the actual or potential support of their parent bank. We find that the rise in counterparty risk substantially decreased the probability of obtaining funds from foreign banks. When the analysis is restricted to Italian and foreign banks with relatively comparable asset compositions, the result holds. In addition, where safer banks or more stable lending relationships are involved the effect is attenuated.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
C24 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Truncated and Censored Models, Switching Regression Models
- 29 August 2016
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1949Details
- Abstract
- We study the effects on the stock market of a securities transaction tax (STT). In particular, we focus on the recent introduction of a STT in Italy. Indeed, a peculiarity of the Italian STT is that it only concerns stocks of corporations with a market capitalization above 500 million euros. We exploit this feature via a differences-in-differences approach (comparing taxed and non-taxed stocks both before and after the introduction of the new tax). We ?find that the new tax widened the bid-ask spread and increased volatility, while it left transaction volumes and returns substantially unaffected. Results are broadly similar using a regression discontinuity design, in which we confront the performance of stocks just above the threshold with those just below.
- JEL Code
- G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
H24 : Public Economics→Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue→Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- 2 April 2014
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1664Details
- Abstract
- We propose a new method to identify the impact of a change in the tax burden on mutual fund inflows, exploiting a switch from an accrual-based to a realisation-based tax regime. We use quasi-experimental data from Italy where, starting from July 2011, the tax regime for domestic mutual funds was changed from an accruals basis to a realisation basis, while the taxation of foreign funds remained on a realisation basis. We find that the reform has had a positive effect on net inflows of Italian funds (the treated group) with respect to foreign funds (the control group). The effect is both economically and statistically significant. Moreover, we find no evidence that the increase in the demand for Italian funds came at the expense of foreign funds.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
H2 : Public Economics→Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - Network
- Household Finance and Consumption Network (HFCN)
- 2024
- Journal of Financial Stability
- 2023
- Journal of Financial Stability
- 2022
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- 2019
- International Journal of Central Banking
- 2017
- Journal of Financial Stability
- 2014
- Journal of Pension Economics & Finance
- 2010
- The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics