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Michiel Kaijser
- 1 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2692Details
- Abstract
- Overlapping portfolios constitute a well-recognised source of risk, providing a channel for financial contagion induced by the market price impact of asset deleveraging. We introduce a novel method to assess the market price impact on a security-by-security basis from historical daily traded volumes and price returns. Systemic risk within the euro area financial system of banks and investment funds is then assessed by considering contagion between individual institutions’ portfolio holdings under a severe stress scenario. As a result, we show how the bias of more homogeneous estimation techniques, commonly employed for market impact, might lead to loss estimates that are more than twice as large as losses estimated with heterogeneous price impact parameters. Another new feature in this work is the application of a price-at-risk measure instead of the average market price impact to evaluate the tail risk of possible market price movements in scenarios of different severity. Our results also show that system-level losses at the tail can be three times higher than average losses using the same scenario.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 22 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 281Details
- Abstract
- Climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing humankind this century. If left unchecked, it is likely to result in more frequent and severe climatic events, with the potential to cause substantial disruption to our economies, businesses and livelihoods in the coming decades. Yet the associated risks remain poorly understood, as climate shocks differ from the financial shocks observed during previous crises. This paper describes the ECB’s economy-wide climate stress test, which has been developed to assess the resilience of non-financial corporates (NFCs) and euro area banks to climate risks, under various assumptions in terms of future climate policies. This stress test comprises three main pillars: (i) climate-specific scenarios to project climate and macroeconomic conditions over the next 30 years; (ii) a comprehensive dataset that combines climate and financial information for millions of companies worldwide and approximately 1,600 consolidated euro area banks; (iii) a novel set of climate-specific models to capture the direct and indirect transmission channels of climate risk drivers for firms and banks.
- JEL Code
- C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
C55 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Modeling with Large Data Sets?
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
- 6 August 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2581Details
- Abstract
- This paper shows how the combined endogenous reaction of banks and investment funds to an exogenous shock can amplify or dampen losses to the financial system compared to results from single-sector stress testing models. We build a new model of contagion propagation using a very large and granular data set for the euro area. Based on the economic shock caused by the Covid-19 outbreak, we model three sources of exogenous shocks: a default shock, a market shock and a redemption shock. Our contagion mechanism operates through a dual channel of liquidity and solvency risk. The joint modelling of banks and funds provides new insights for the assessment of financial stability risks. Our analysis reveals that adding the fund sector to our model for banks leads to additional losses through fire sales and a further depletion of banks’ capital ratios by around one percentage point.
- JEL Code
- D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks