Fiscal policy during and after the crisis
Thursday, 10 and Friday, 11 November 2016
ECB main building, Room C2.01, Frankfurt am Main
Programme
Thursday, 10 November 2016
* indicates the presenter
- 09:30
- Registration and coffee
- 10:00
-  
   Welcome remarksPolicy panel 1 The current fiscal governance frameworkChair: Peter Praet, European Central Bank Discussants: 
 Alberto Alesina, Harvard University
 Alexander Stubb, former Finnish Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
 Clemens Fuest, University of Munich
 Maria João Rodrigues, Member of European Parliament, S&D Vice President in charge of Economic and Social Policies
- 11:30
- Coffee break
- 12:00
-  
   Session 1Optimal policy and sovereign defaultChair: Günter Coenen, European Central Bank Paper 1A Model of the Twin Ds: Optimal Default and DevaluationStephanie Schmitt-Grohé*, Seunghoon Na and Martin Uribe, Columbia University; 
 Vivian Zhanwei Yue, Emory UniversityDiscussant: Huixin Bi, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
- 12:45
- Lunch
- 13:45
-  
   Paper 2The Optimal Composition of Government Spending in a Deep RecessionHafedh Bouakez*, HEC Montreal; 
 Michel Guillard, Université Evry Val d'Essonne;
 Jordan Roulleau-Pasdeloup, HEC LausanneDiscussant: Lena Boneva, Bank of England Session 2Fiscal stabilisation policyChair: Francesco Drudi, European Central Bank 
- 14:30
-  
   Paper 3Optimal Automatic StabilizersRicardo Reis*, London School of Economics; Alisdair McKay, Boston University Discussant: Keith Kuester, University of Bonn 
- 15:15
-  
   Paper 4Determinants and Effects of Fiscal Stabilization: New Evidence from Time-Varying EstimatesDavide Furceri* and João Tovar Jalles, International Monetary Fund Discussant: Ryan Banerjee, Bank for International Settlements 
- 16:00
- Coffee break
- 16:30
-  
   Session 3Risk sharingChair: Johannes Lindner, European Central Bank Paper 5The Role of Fiscal Transfers in Smoothing Regional Shocks: Evidence from Existing FederationsTigran Poghosyan*, Abdelhak Senhadji and Carlo Cottarelli, International Monetary Fund Discussant: Massimo Giuliodori, University of Amsterdam 
- 17:15
-  
   Paper 6An Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area? A Comparison of Different Alternatives using Micro DataMathias Dolls*, Centre for European Economic Research; 
 Clemens Fuest, University of Munich;
 Dirk Neumann, Université catholique de Louvain;
 Andreas Peichl, University of MannheimDiscussant: Francesca Carta, Banca d’Italia 
- 19:00
- 
   Conference Dinner
   
 Keynote speech 
 Mario Monti, Senator, former Prime Minister of Italy and EU Commissioner
Friday, 11 November 2016
* indicates the presenter
- 9:00
- 
   Coffee Session 4Fiscal consolidationsChair: Frank Smets, European Central Bank 
- 09:15
-  
   Paper 7Is it the "How" or the "When" that Matters in Fiscal Adjustments?Carlo Favero* and Francesco Giavazzi, Bocconi University; 
 Gualtiero Azzalini, NYU Stern School of Business;
 Alberto Alesina and Armando Miano, Harvard UniversityDiscussant: Gernot Müller, University of Tübingen 
- 10:00
-  
   Paper 8When Fiscal Consolidation Meets Private DeleveragingCarlos Thomas* and Óscar Arce, Banco de España; Javier Andrés, University of Valencia Discussant: Massimiliano Pisani, Banca d’Italia 
- 10:45
- Coffee break
- 11:15
-  
   Policy panel 2Mechanisms of public and private risk-sharing in monetary unionChair: Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank Discussants: 
 Nicolas Véron, Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics
 Peter Grasmann, European Commission
 Erik F. Nielsen, Unicredit
 Marco Pagano, University of Naples Federico II and ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee
- 12:45
- Lunch
- 13:45
-  
   Session 5: Fiscal stanceChair: Christophe Kamps, European Central Bank Paper 9Measuring and assessing the fiscal stance in the euro area: Methodological issuesEloise Orseau* and Matteo Salto, European Commission Discussant: Krzysztof Bankowski, European Central Bank 
- 14:30
-  
   Paper 10Fiscal Policy Changes and Aggregate Demand in the U.S. Before, During and Following the Great RecessionWilliam B. Peterman*, David Cashin, Jamie Lenney and Byron Lutz, Federal Reserve Board Discussant: António Afonso, University of Lisbon 
- 15:15
-  
   Paper 11Fiscal Spillovers in the Euro Area: Sign, Size and DeterminantsJosef Hollmayr*, Deutsche Bundesbank; Georgios Georgiadis, European Central Bank Discussant: Roel Beetsma, University of Amsterdam and European Fiscal Board 
- 16:00
- End of conference
Fiscal policy during and after the crisis
In view of the crisis experienced in Europe over the past years, the conference sought to explore the role fiscal policy plays in business cycle stabilisation as well as in risk-sharing in a monetary union. The two policy panels of the conference – chaired by Peter Praet (member of the Executive Board), and Vítor Constâncio (Vice-President), respectively – were devoted to (i) “The current fiscal governance framework”; and (ii) “Mechanisms of public and private risk-sharing in a monetary union”. Discussions underlined the importance of cooperation in European policymaking, which should be seen as a positive-sum rather than a zero-sum game. The policy panels were accompanied by academic sessions that focused on various aspects of fiscal policy, including the optimal use of automatic stabilisers, the role of fiscal transfers in smoothing regional shocks, the composition and timing of fiscal adjustments and the concept and measurement of the fiscal stance for the euro area and the United States.
The current fiscal governance framework
The participants on the first policy panel agreed that the reformed fiscal framework was not fully achieving its objectives. They pointed out that the complexity of the rules had unduly increased, implementation was insufficient and the surveillance process was too often subject to political influence. Participants argued that instead of multiplying rules and controls, greater trust among Member States needed to be rebuilt, and measures to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the framework should also be considered. As assigning more powers to a central institution might pose challenges in terms of legitimacy and political feasibility in the short to medium term, one panellist made the case for more national responsibility and an enhancement of the role of markets as a disciplining device. Another participant stressed that the low growth potential and sluggish demand in the European Union accentuated the necessity of tackling the existing investment gap. However, there were diverging views on the exclusion of public investment from the definition of the deficit in the fiscal rules (known as the “golden rule”). Doubts were expressed as to the need for further investment in conventional infrastructure, but the need for more investment to support the digital economy and the ongoing energy transformation was also underlined.
Mechanisms of public and private risk-sharing in a monetary union
The second panel focused on the different risk-sharing channels, such as capital markets, credit via the banking system or public sector channels of risk-sharing. In general, it was stressed that significantly more shocks were smoothed via these risk-sharing channels in the United States than in Europe. There was also agreement that private sector risk-sharing via capital and credit markets was a much more important source of shock absorption than public sector risk-sharing in mature federations such as the United States. This held an important lesson for European initiatives for deepening Economic and Monetary Union. As regards private channels of risk-sharing, while participants agreed that the Capital Markets Union was far from being completed, the initiative was seen as an important step towards integrating and developing EU capital markets further. However, many crucial policy issues, such as taxation for example, were by and large subject to national competences which limited the Commission’s scope for further action. Participants expressed the view that Banking Union had increased the resilience of the euro area but noted that its architecture was still incomplete. Some panellists pointed out that the current environment was challenging for banks’ business models, but acknowledged that banks had to take action themselves, for example by reducing operating costs and being open to consolidation in the sector. While not all the discussants agreed on the precise magnitude and interplay of the sovereign bank feedback loop, all participants shared the idea that sovereign exposures should be reduced, even if home bias in public debt held by banks was at lower than pre-crisis levels.
General information
Transfers: Participants are requested to arrange their own transfers from and to the airport, unless indicated otherwise
Dinner venue: Goldmund im Literaturhaus, Frankfurt am Main
 Schöne Aussicht 2, 60311 Frankfurt am Main
+49 (0) 69 210 85 985, Email: info@gold-mund.de 
Please note that this programme may be subject to change without notice.
Conference email address: fiscal-conference-2016@ecb.europa.eu
- Jacopo Cimadomo, Directorate General Economics
 Tel.: +49 (0) 69 1344 5392, email: Jacopo.Cimadomo@ecb.europa.eu
- Sebastian Schmidt, Directorate General Research
 Tel.: +49 (0) 69 1344 8266, email: Sebastian.Schmidt@ecb.europa.eu
- Stephanie Bergbauer, Directorate General International and European Relations
 Tel.: +49 (0) 69 1344 9774, email: Stephanie.Bergbauer@ecb.europa.eu
- Annekatrin Bergmann, Directorate General Economics
 Tel.: +49 (0) 69 1344 7818, email: Annekatrin.Bergmann@ecb.europa.eu
Submission deadline: 31 July 2016
The role of fiscal policy for business-cycle stabilisation and for risk sharing in a monetary union is a matter of interest for both policymakers and academics, especially in view of the financial crisis in Europe of past years. The aim of the conference is to explore this role, accompanied by policy discussions on completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a focus on improving the EMU fiscal policy framework.
The conference will be hosted by the European Central Bank, in Frankfurt am Main on 10-11 November 2016.
Topics
Theoretical and empirical macroeconomic papers on the following topics are particularly welcome:
- The role of fiscal policy as a stabilising tool, with a particular focus on fiscal policy stabilisation in monetary unions
- Public risk-sharing mechanisms within monetary unions, including links with private risk sharing
- The aggregate euro area fiscal stance, the national and international transmission of fiscal shocks
- Tools to assess the long-term sustainability of public finances, measures of fiscal limits and fiscal space
- The quality of fiscal policies, e.g. the optimal composition of public expenditure and tax policies
- Monetary and fiscal determinants of inflation
- The inter-linkages between fiscal policy and the financial sector
The scope of the conference can, however, be considered to be wider than the themes listed above, and submissions on other related topics are also encouraged. It is planned that the conference material will be published on the ECB’s website.
The conference will include invited speaker presentations by Carlo Favero (Bocconi University), Timothy Kehoe (University of Minnesota), and Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé (Columbia University). Members of the ECB’s Executive Board will also participate.
Submissions
Please submit papers in PDF format to fiscal-conference-2016@ecb.europa.eu by 31 July 2016. Authors will be notified whether their papers have been accepted by 31 August 2016.
Expenses
Travel and accommodation expenses of the presenters of accepted papers and discussants will be covered by the ECB. Participants from central banks and other official institutions will be expected to cover their own expenses.
Conference organisers
- Jacopo Cimadomo
- Sebastian Schmidt
- Florian Walch