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Miguel A. Ferreira

14 February 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2639
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Abstract
We show that FinTech lending affects credit markets and real economic activity using a unique data set of a Peer-to-Business platform for which we have the universe of loan applications. We find that FinTech serves high quality and creditworthy small businesses who already have access to bank credit. Firms use FinTech to obtain long-term unsecured loans and reduce their exposure to banks with less liquid assets, stable funds, and capital. We find that access to FinTech spurs firm growth, employment and investment relative to firms that get their loan application rejected. In addition, firms with access to FinTech increase leverage and substitute long-term bank debt with FinTech debt. Our findings suggest that FinTech allows firms to preserve financial flexibility, reduce their bank dependence and exposure to banking shocks.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
O33 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Technological Change, Research and Development, Intellectual Property Rights→Technological Change: Choices and Consequences, Diffusion Processes
3 July 2009
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1066
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Abstract
Banks play a role in the corporate governance of firms as well as acting as debt financiers around the world. Universal banks can have control over borrowing firms by representation on the board of directors or by holding shares through direct stakes or institutional holdings. We investigate the effects of these bank-firm governance links on the global syndicated loan market. We find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers, charge higher interest rate spreads and face less credit risk after origination when they have some role in firm's governance. This increase in interest rate spread is less pronounced for borrowers with access to international capital markets. Our results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank-firm governance link. Our findings suggest that the benefits of bank involvement in firms' governance accrue mostly to the banks.
JEL Code
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
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ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme